Illich, and Szasz, and others, have been questioning for years if there is such a thing as mental disease, and Murray Jarvik once wrote a paper called 'Are there any psychotropic drugs?' Most people, even today, would probably answer 'yes' to the first question. Fewer, perhaps, are sure ifJarvik's question has been affirmatively answered, 30 years later. Talbott Reciprocal validation of diagnosis, treatment and methodology Simply put, the activities needed for acquiring new knowledge symmetrically relate diagnosis, treatment and outcome. This triangular symmetry is found in the context of patient management, in explanatory studies of the aetiology and process of the disease as well as in clinical trials. The treating physician needs the assurance of adequate clinical and laboratory tests to differentiate the diagnosis of the patient, and the correct drug for the treatment; the methodologist needs correctly diagnosed patients as well as efficient drugs to increase the precision of diagnostic tests; and the triallist needs the right methods and patients to be sure These remarks require more substantiation than a demonstration that the number of new psychiatric diagnostic entities has increased pari passu with the increase in the number of new chemical entities brought to the stage ofclinical research; it would also be desirable to show that a drug may become available before the diagnosis to which it is later found to be appropriate. Certainly the advent of a new treatment may be followed by a change in the relative incidences ofdifferent diagnoses -that oflithium, for instance, was followed by the more frequent diagnosis of mania and less of paranoid schizophrenia'.
The withdrawal of a drug can have a similar effect. The withdrawal ofclioquinol in Japan, and the consequent non-availability of the diagnosis of subacute myelo-opticoneuropathy to Japanese neurologists, has reportedly been followed by an increase in that of multiple sclerosis (D Lehmann, personal communication).
It follows from the triangular symmetry that the role of patients, from the point of view of the other elements, is to validate tests (diagnostic and prognostic) and to demonstrate the actions of drugs. It will therefore be helpful to replace the single humanistic concept of the patient, if only for a moment, by the two abstract functions ofdiagnosis and outcome. The triangle is really a tetragon (Figure 1 ), and it is only by comparing the outcome of treatment with the untreated prognosis that the use of tests (including drugs) can be validated.
As with the triangle, the elements of the tetragon interlock. For example, treatment cannot be chosen until the diagnosis has been made (the not infrequent failure to reach a diagnosis before selecting treatment, a repeat prescription or no treatment at all is itself a diagnosis, although not an exact one3 '4) .
Treatment needs further differentiation of diagnosis in order that its own power may itself advance, and better diagnosis implies differentiated treatments. The separation of a large diagnostic group into smaller subgroups, some of which may consist of single individuals, some of whom prove to be satisfactorily treated, requires that there be available a variety of products, many of which are often dismissed as me-toos (or even me-agains).
Starting points Biological markers Searches for biological markers on the one hand and for drugs with specific actions on the other have appeared to be more promising as starting points than the pathology ofbehaviour, which has largely to be described in words. Words mean different things to different people, so behavioural diagnosis, prognosis, and evaluation are the least satisfactory points of reference against which to validate other tests. Biochemical and pharmacological tests, the reagents of which can be specified unambiguously in internationally acceptable language, are therefore easily tested against each other; for example, in the rat CNS in vivo changes of noradrenaline uptake can be observed following different doses of a tricyclic antidepressant. On the other hand, behavioural tests may be validated against chemical, as in the use of the dexamethasone suppression test (DST) to define diagnostic subgroups of depression. Since Carroll and his colleagues first standardized this test5, it has been subjected to intensive use and considerable scrutiny. Arana et al. 6 have recently reviewed its use in the diagnosis of affective disorders and the differential diagnosis of depressive subgroups, as well as -to a lesser extent -for the prediction of outcome under various types of antidepressive treatment. They discuss over 200 papers, including 6 earlier reviews, and conclude that both 'uncritical enthusiasm or excessive scepticism' in regard to the use of the DST 'are unwarranted'.
Another ofmany examples in biological psychiatry of reputed chemical-behavioural cross-validation is blood platelet receptor imipramine binding (PRIB) as a marker for depression. Unlike the DST, which may be linked to a mechanism or at least a genuine concomitant of the disease, the PRIB represents an altogether more superficial kind of validation -the coincident in pursuit of the irrelevant: something like Oscar Wilde's definition of a fox hunt.
Pharmacological mechanisms
The search for substances with specific actions may, however, be misguided if it is not based on systems that localize the delivery of their burdens with remarkable accuracy. Little more than 30 years ago, chemical transmission in the central nervous system was believed to depend upon only two chemicals, acetylcholine and noradrenaline. Now, there are tens of established transmitters and more are still being identified, although at a rate that suggests an asymptote -with present technology -at a total of some 400-500 (A Mandell, personal communication). Why should a system of such exquisite chemical complexity (not to speak of its structural and functional complexities) obligingly repair its behavioural deficiencies when given a whiff of tricyclic grapeshot? It is almost as if one were to use a steamroller to treat a case of urinary retention. Nevertheless, in regard to the CNS this is something like what we do, and it may be remarkable that there is so little damage in the process. In fact, the metaphor may not be strong or mixed enough. Individually targeted Minutemen are needed instead of Multiple Re-entry Vehicles, that will carry a skilfully mixed Molotov cocktail of substances with individual patientspecific actions (A Mandell, personal communication). This will be quite different from the crude, so-called lytic cocktail designed by Laborit and his colleagues that took anaesthetic advantage of the wide range of actions shown by chlorpromazine .
Bowden answers his own question as to whether it is feasible to select drugs on the basis of their neurochemical properties: 'for now, the answer is no'8. His reason is that most physicians, even those working in hospital, do not have the necessary laboratory methods available to make the estimates required for the purpose.
Before the physician can come into possession of an armamentarium of the required delicacy, much more work on delivery systems is needed in addition to the acquisition of more detailed knowledge of the chemical sensitivities and locations of structures involved in specific functions. Not only is it possible that we do not need more information about existing drugs, but it is even possible that we do not need any more new drugs.
Clinical trials
The methodology of clinical trials, a standby of drug research for 50 years, is presently under deep and broad criticism. Trials are considered to be remote from real-life conditions, unethical, frequently inconclusive and contradictory. Even when these criticisms are not valid, trials make little impact on medical practice, in part 'because we have [not] the physical capability to apply the full force of the scientific method to our own kind'; given only 'finite resources ... we cannot address all questions in clinical medicine through their methodology'9. Glass and Freedman10 note that 'primary care physicians appear to recognize and treat mental distress at a rate about double the rate they diagnose mental disorders'.
The traditional purpose of a clinical trial is to evaluate treatment, though there is more to it than that. A series of 5 Laboratory testing was scarcely more homogeneous or thorough: 'routine blood and/or urinalysis' was referred to 3 times, ECGs were taken 3 times and EEGs twice. Blood 5-HT was determined once and specialized measurements of thyroid activity were made in the study where this was obviously necessary. Adverse drug events were specifically checked and mentioned in only 2 papers. Pulse and blood pressure results were not reported in the one paper that claimed to have determined them. To be fair, clinical examination, like anamnesis, may have been considered by all investigators as so much a part of routine that it was not thought worthy of report: though, in fact, one paper nevertheless did so.
Thus, reports about the efficacy of new drugs are often seriously defective. There is minimal systematization or standardization ofthe clinical, behavioural and laboratory methods used, and even the information that is presumably collected is incompletely reported. There should surely be agreement that a core of data be collected in all studies, and on comprehensive reporting of that which is collected.
Rating scales
Coccaro and Siever" consider that 'the choice of antidepressant depends upon the efficacy and adverse side effect profiles of the agents in question. However, since all antidepressants appear to be equally efficacious, the decision largely depends upon patient characteristics and the adverse side effect profiles of the various drugs.' But they give no explicit indication of what they mean by patient characteristics, and the reader is left to infer that one should perhaps beware of administering trazodone to men of a certain age wearing dirty mackintoshes.
Despite intense activity over many years to develop diagnostic and evaluative rating scales, it is clear from such reports as those of M0ller et al.12"13, from the statements ofpsychiatrists in practice that 'drugs are given for symptoms rather than for diagnostic labels'"4, and from implicit accusations or explicit assertions by the authors of each new instrument, that the previous ones were unsatisfactory. Pichot"5, too, asks:
'Do psychotropic drugs act on mechanisms specific to a class ofpatients, defined at the descriptive level as a syndrome, or at the etiologic, as a disease, or do they influence the mechanisms which determine the position of a patient along a dimension? According to the answer given, a drug ought to be specific to a class of patients, or its action ought to cut across the presently used categories. It seems that, whereas present researchers in psychopharmacology seem to favour the first approach -by trying for example to develop drugs acting on specific mechanisms of neurotransmission -the clinician does not hesitate in practice to adopt the so-called symptomatic position, which corresponds in fact to an adherence to the dimensional model: he will simultaneously give neuroleptics and antidepressants to a patient with both schizophrenic and depressive features, as if each were acting independently on one of two dimensions.'
In the circumstances such classifactory systems as those proposed by Kielholz'6 or Poldinger'7 appear to be premature, or over-simple.
Lest these remarks seem unduly negative, one should not overlook the superhuman efforts made in recent years, particularly by the Danish school, to increase understanding of the theoretical basis of depression rating scales and the relationships between them'8"l9. But, as these authors themselves point out, the kappa coefficients for intercorrelation of the scales studied, though statistically significant, are all disappointingly low. Although they discuss validity before dealing with reliability, at least they do discuss it. Studies of the validity -in virtually any of its senses -of DSM-II are almost totally lacking20 22. The same is apparently true of ICD9. According to Feinstein23, infrequent attempts to check the usage of this instrument have 'suggested that the domain of vital statistics was intellectually moribund'.
It may be all too true, as Morozov says24, that 'a universal classification of mental disorders does not exist', but the WHO philosophy that 'one system is applicable to research projects, another to statistics, a third is good for therapy, etc.', seems unduly complacent and contributory to the problems discussed here. Incidentally, Morozov's opinion that 'Slavic psychiatrists use their own sensitive "soul mechanism" for a very sophisticated assessment of differentiated personality changes at the emotional level'24 illustrates the difficulties of achieving cross-cultural credibility in diagnostic classification.
Kendell25 believes 'there is abundant evidence that the provision of operational definitions for all psychiatric syndromes is the most effective means available ... for improving the reliability of psychiatric diagnoses'.
The suggestion made here is that operational definitions should be both (1) Not all stages of sleep are equally important. In this respect, Adam and Oswald3 defined that sleep with large EEG slow waves is 'worth more' because of its restorative properties. Furthermore, Dement4 was the first to show that when sleep is deprived of especially REM, there appears to be a compensation for the sleep loss as soon as unbroken sleep is allowed; in the same way, selective deprivation of SWS leads to an increase in SWS afterwards5-'. So it seems that both types of sleep are needed, although several studies8'9 indicate marked declines in sleep duration (decreased SWS) and sleep quality through maturity and old age. Whether this phenomenon is physiological or pathological remains unclear.
As to sleep related to illness, and more particularly psychiatric illness, Hawkins et al. 10 suggested that sleep may protect against depression and that if the individual sleep mechanisms work less well, the subject may be more susceptible to depression on the one hand, and attacks may be more severe on the other hand. In this context, it is stated that depression tends to be more frequent and more severe with aging9'1'.
Acute and chronic schizophrenic patients have very low levels of deep SWS (NREM, Stage 4), a finding which has been confirmed repeatedly'2-4. Further evidence has recently been published by Hiatt et al." , reporting the preliminary results of an ongoing investigation in unmedicated schizophrenics. They demonstrated highly significant abnormalities in delta wave forms, illustrating the robust nature of the disturbance of NREM physiology in this illness: 'While not present in all schizophrenic patients, altered 0.5 to 3 Hz EEG may prove to be the most reliable (i.e. consistently present) brain abnormality yet described in this illness'. It was proposed"6 that NREM sleep is a correlate of a metabolic process that acts to reverse the effects of waking on the brain and that this process occurs at its highest rate during Stage 4. Thus evidence continues to accumulate on the relevance of SWS, especially in those subjects with 
